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ABSTRACT
This paper contends that even as jurists invoke the official canonic version of the
legal text, it is in danger of being replaced for the jurist, as well as for the lay
person, if it has not been substituted already, by some apocryphal, inauthentic or
casual text. We argue that in addition to the approximate nature of legal
knowledge, the overuse of overedited and perverted casebooks, as well as the dis-
tribution of legal information among imperfect sources - some official but partial,
others inauthentic but highly accessible, and a few reliable but highly unafforda-
ble commercial sources - are largely responsible for this situation.
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Perhaps one of the most well-known passages from H.L.A. Hart's landmark
work on jurisprudence, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, is his example of a rule at the en-
trance to a park: No vehicles in the park.' He then explores the ambiguity of that
rule: does it forbid roller skates, bicycles, toy automobiles, airplanes, and the con-
sequence of that ambiguity for law and its meaning. Hart ends by insisting that for
most rules, which are expressed in language that is inherently ambiguous, there is
a core of unambiguous meaning surrounded by a penumbra of ambiguity. He goes
further to say that when judges and lawyers address the penumbra they do so by
reference to social and cultural values.
For us, there is a far more important question. First, Hart's example examines
law from the perspective of the jurist, not that of the lay person. But even as a
jurist, he does not pay attention to how jurists are taught the law vis-h-vis the text
of the law, and whether that has any potential implications in the way they under-
stand and apply the law, and on how judges' work is understood by the lay person.
Here we continue where Hart stopped. We investigate what it means for the
legal professional to learn the law by reading excerpts of cases spoon-fed to make
learning easier. We wonder whether such an artifice which pretends to bring the
student to the original source encourages an already budding instinct for the apoc-
ryphal, rather than the original source. We understand, of course, that the evolution
of the casebook has followed the evolution of law, and the notion that law encom-
passes more than appellate cases. But we believe it was never contemplated that
students and future judges would learn less about law (including appellate cases
in their original form), rather than more, by editing cases and adding other mate-
rials.
Second, we analyze the current cultural climate and how it affects the com-
mon person's understanding of the law, even though Hart completely shies away
from that study. In fact, for Hart, and those who came before, like Austin, Witt-
genstein, and even Holmes, and after, like Fuller, the test of a legal system was
always jurist-oriented. Jurisprudes seem to have missed entirely how the very fo-
cus of the legal system, the common person, might become less confident of her
legal system as ambiguity, or the recognition and acceptance of ambiguity, rises.
And, in turn, it is our view, or fear, that the legal system must become both less
reliable and less integral, as the common person loses faith, or worse, in an am-
biguous legal system.
What we have noticed, in our current media-centric and polarized society, is
that the way law, in Hart's sense, is delivered to the public creates increasing am-
biguity such that any public-centric measure of law loses almost all its sense and
content. If law, to be law, must be known or knowable, to the public, law today is
"known" in a plethora of ways, many of them mutually inconsistent. And we won-
der whether that qualifies as law at all, if law has no core identity itself.
In many ways, one of the points of this article is that we have moved far away
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio.
** Ph. D., Librarian and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia University Law School, New York,
NY. Dana would like to thank ZouZou and Izzie, her muses.
1 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593,
606-15 (1958). The example is reprised in modified form in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 125-27 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994).
482
The Many Texts of the Law
from the common man's sense of legal certainty2 that Jeremy Bentham favored
when he demanded that law be clear and concise enough to be posted at the en-
trance to every railway station.3 It is that same sense of certainty that French cod-
ification sought by reducing inconsistent, haphazard, judicial decisions to a short
and concise legal code. And, finally, it is that same sense that New York's Justice
Field sought when attempting an American codification.4
This paper contends that even as jurists invoke the official canonic version
of the legal text, it is in danger of being replaced for the jurist, and for the lay
person, if it has not been substituted already, by some apocryphal, inauthentic or
casual text. We argue that in addition to the approximate nature of legal
knowledge, the overuse of overedited and perverted casebooks, as well as the dis-
tribution of legal information among imperfect sources - some official but partial,
others inauthentic but highly accessible, and a few reliable but highly unaffordable
commercial sources - are largely responsible for this situation.
I. THE IMPERFECT NATURE OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE ENCOURAGES
AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE RULE OF LAW
From an abstract point of view, law represents the product of "many different
wills and imaginations, interests and visions." ' At this basic level, society is per-
ceived as the association of humans whose assumed eternal hostility to one another
requires that order and freedom be maintained by government with the help of a
specific linguistic tool called law. Governments use laws, man-made rules, be-
cause such institutional behavior satisfies a specific social and political desire or
value, that of a society governed by legal language, by law. This postulate does
not represent a universal or even an a-historic value. It has always been connected
to the liberal state as we know it since the Glorious Revolution of 1688,6 Which
established the victory of the English Parliament over the King, or the victory of
"impersonal rules" over the King's whimsical desires, expressed as subjective lan-
guage, i.e., "because I say so". In other words, our liberal society is intrinsically
connected to prescriptive and normative rules, which bear on everybody's conduct
by stating what their subjects "may do, ought to do, or ought not to do." ' On a
different plane, but reflecting what might be assumed to be a natural human in-
stinct, both the Decalogue and Hammurabi's Code predate the Glorious Revolution
by several millennia.
Roberto M. Unger's definition of the role of the laws in our society appears
2 [Either] I greatly overrate or [Bentham] greatly underrates the task not only [of digesting]
our Statutes into a concise and clear system, but [of reducing] our unwritten to a text law."
(Madison's answer to Bentham's offer to codify the American law and make it clear for all
judges to apply) William D. Bader, Meditations on the Original: James Madison, Framer
with Common Law Intentions - Ramifications in the Contemporary Supreme Court, 20 VT.
L. REv. 5, 7 (1995).
3 JOHN DINWIDDY, BENTHAM (1989).
4 See generally, CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1969).
5 ROBERTO MANGABEIRAUNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME 65 (1996).
6 For more on the Glorious Revolution, see, e.g., Larry Kramer. Putting the Politics Back
100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000).
7ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 69 (1975).
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both poetic and idealistic but also deeply ambiguous:
[Laws] place limits on the pursuit of private ends, thereby ensuring that natural
egoism will not turn into a free-for-all in which everyone and everything is en-
dangered. They also facilitate mutual collaboration. The two tasks are connected
because a peaceful social order in which we know what to expect from others is
a condition for the accomplishment of any of our goals. More specifically, it is
the job of the laws to guarantee the supreme good of social life, order and free-
dom.'
Whether idealistic or not, Unger seems correct in his perception of what the
subjects of the law expect from it: to provide order. Thus, rather than ask Hart's
open-ended question, "What is law?"9 this paper asks "What makes a text law?"
For Hart, law was the same phenomenon that Hans Kelsen had articulated earlier
- rules emanating from places of authority.10 Hart developed this positivist ap-
proach. He expanded the meaning of law beyond that of knowledge whose source
was statutes, cases, international law, customs, etc., to emphasize that legal con-
cepts embraced social theory and philosophic inquiry, too. 1 Hart halted his inquiry
there, though. He did not negate the existence of imperfect legal knowledge, or
legal "rumor" or "garble," 12 as Leslie Green describes the general, although per-
haps mistaken, understanding of Hart's work.
Hart mentioned that for the ordinary person law is something vague. He
found evidence of approximate legal knowledge when he explained its limits.
Few Englishmen are unaware that there is a law forbidding murder, or requiring
the payment of income tax, or specifying what must be done to make a valid will.
Virtually everyone except the child or foreigner coming across the English word
'law' for the first time could easily multiply such examples, and most people
could do more. They could describe, at least in outline, how to find out whether
something is the law in England; they know that there are experts to consult and
courts with a final authoritative voice on all such questions. 13
Notwithstanding its approximate nature, Hart explained, legal knowledge is
sufficient to ensure law's preeminent normative role. Hart did not ponder the tex-
tualization of legal rules. Perhaps based on his continental experience where legal
information has a different distribution than in the United States, he assumed that
the public would access and interact with the official text of the law or, more likely,
consult an expert. That interaction ensured his fellow citizens' ability to explain or
to "cite" and describe "at least in outline" the law. This limited legal knowledge
nevertheless enabled the normative function of law to continue unobstructed, and
the desired social order to voluntarily and democratically be maintained. The un-
broken flow of the legal outline from the legislature to the judge to the lay person
assured a common understanding of law, an understanding so undebated, that Hart
did not think to address the possibility of its absence.
8 Id.
9 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed., 2012).
10 See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1961).
" Leslie Green, Introduction in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW xv (3d ed., 2012).
12 Id.
13 See HART, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasis added).
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Despite Hart's focus on the fact that "general [legal] rules, standards, and
principles" which represented "the main instrument of social control"" and not on
the gap between their enactment, publication, and application, his precise obser-
vations about legal knowledge and its normative implications facilitated subse-
quent analysis into the moment of law's actuation and the cognitive and practical
gap it creates. This essay continues Hart's analysis and deepens his inquiry into
our interaction with the sources of law, which is what Hart calls the "deliberate,
datable acts," " whether it comes from a legislative, judiciary or executive body.
It points out that Hart seemed to have assumed legal knowledge was generated by
a subject's (almost invariably ajudge's) interaction with the official text of the law,
which could incorporate social observations or even philosophical inquiry. How-
ever, this essay goes further and contests Hart's assumption about the totality of
ways we interact with the law. Usually, as seen here, because of the nature of legal
information and the way it is disseminated, law is realized through an interaction
with something other than the "official" or the canonic legal text and it incorpo-
rates pre-existing cultural knowledge or "legal gossip." From this perspective,
Hart's penumbra is not a mere technicality, but is as central to law as its core text.
This becomes more important, as we argue below, in that the penumbra has re-
cently expanded beyond all imagined limits, and threatens to continue to do so, at
the same rapid rate, and perhaps even more rapidly, for the foreseeable future.
Far from a heresy, this argument resonates with Dworkin's work, which has
described law as "an interpretive concept like courtesy."16 While it is hard to gauge
a person's legal knowledge, there are tools to investigate the nature of legal
knowledge. For instance, Dworkin described the work of the members of the ju-
diciary as interpretive theories which "are grounded" in their
convictions about the 'point' - the justifying purpose or goal or principle
- of legal practice as a whole, and these convictions will inevitably be
different, at least in detail, from those of other judges. Nevertheless a va-
riety of forces tempers these differences and conspires toward conver-
gence.17
If legal knowledge were to be as perfect as mathematical knowledge, for in-
stance, there would be no need to work on tempering difference and ensuring con-
vergence - the method of inquiry would discard mathematical deviation. To the
contrary, as Dworkin explained, legal knowledge uses specific tools to produce its
ultimate normative goals: (1) the doctrine of "stare decisis" and the judge's pre-
sumed role to follow legal precedent; (2) the "inevitable conservatism of formal
legal education" and (3) the conservatism of the process of selecting lawyers for
judicial and administrative office." Dworkin did not opine about another tool
which is inherent to all human constructs, including law, and legal knowledge:
cultural convergence. To the extent that there are cultural values which distinguish
American culture among other cultures, culture acts as a corrective which tempers
14 Id. at 124.
11 Id. at 44.16 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 87 (1986).
17 Id. at 87-88.
18 Id.
19Id.
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legal differences and, for instance in the form of moral norms, becomes incorpo-
rated in our theory of a legal system and the mandates which establish it.20 On the
other hand, international legal convergence, a popular subject in international law
assures some tempering of legal differences on the international level. 21
While none of the scholars briefly discussed above qualified their under-
standing of legal knowledge as "imperfect," they did so incidentally, by relying on
non-legal texts to find the meaning of law. The question remains though whether
our legal knowledge, our understanding of our legal system, has to be imperfect,
and whether deciphering the meaning of law requires incorporating our cultural
values and general knowledge. Does it have to start, at least for the lay person,
with our approximate readings of apocryphal unofficial legal texts? Because if it
does, it would more surely end with that type of source too. Is there something in
the nature of legal knowledge that makes it easier for the public to access and use
cultural legal manifestations rather than the canonic text of the law? The next par-
agraphs suggest that both the rigid hierarchy of official or canonical legal
knowledge mirrored by obtusely written texts shape the approximate nature of le-
gal knowledge.
Unger described legal knowledge as highly structural and used the concepts
of theory and practice or social practice to illustrate this.22 But, if we are to believe
that "individuals and individual interests are the primary elements of social life,
and because they are locked in a perpetual struggle with one another, [and] social
order [is] established by acts of will and protected against the ravages of self-in-
terest,"23 then it makes more sense to describe legal knowledge using the concepts
of theory and prudence, defined by Unger as "the knowledge of particulars or rea-
soning about particular choices."24 We would amend Unger's definition to say that
prudence in its dialectical connection with legal theory is political reasoning ap-
plied to specific historical moments to reach social order. What differentiates legal
knowledge from other knowledge systems is its object. For instance, legal theory
and prudence incorporate the most distinctive and general political values of a
governmental entity and translate them into legal norms or text. Those values are
further practically applied to historical moments as statutes and case law.
From its inception, the United States has always been the result of a dual
political commitment to a democratic republic and to a market system intrinsically
20 See, e.g, JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 2003). For additional reading, see JEREMY WALDRON,
THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).
21 See articles on convergence, in such areas as TRIPS, especially IP. E.g., J. Janewa Osei-
tutu, Value Divergence in Global Intellectual Property Law, 87 IND. L.J. 1639, 1647 (2012)
(the article explains how value divergence is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement and how
it can gradually lead to the convergence of intellectual property interests) CARLOS M.
CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 3-4 (2000). Thomas K. Cheng, Convergence and
Its Discontents: A Reconsideration of the Merits of Convergence of Global Competition
Law, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 433, 490 (2012) (This Article examines the recent phenomenon of
the convergence of competition law regimes across the globe).22 ROBERTO MANGABEIRAUNGER,THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 9 (1986).
23 UNGER, supra note 7, at 75.
24 Id. at 254.
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connected to it, as if one could not have existed without the other. This social and
political structure relied on a "legally defined institutional structure that went
along with it."25 As Unger pointed out, there is a clear agreement between the
political commitment and the legal theory explaining, exposing, and making it
happen. Like all legal systems, ours too incorporates the general principles asso-
ciated with the embraced political commitment. Within the umbrella of its own
"rule of law" then, it puts them to work. Incorporating Unger's explanation, our
legal knowledge mirrors the United States legal system which can be described as
the marriage between a specific type of legal theory, our expanded view of Unger's
prudence26 and their practical application through specific statutes, cases, rules,
and regulations.
Legal theory contains the most abstract rendition of our political commit-
ment, under the name of "the rule of law," while prudence represents the linguistic
application of that theoretical ideal to a set of historical particular circumstances
or "reasoning about particular choices." 27 Unger's hierarchy is unclear - whether
a duopoly or triumvirate. However, it makes sense to add another clear element to
his theory and prudence and distinguish prudence from practice. Thus, legal
knowledge is dominated by a triumvirate - theory, prudence, practice - as they are
necessary to govern our market-based social hierarchy, always described as our
liberal society.
While theory, our rule of law, favors normative rules, its practical application
to particular circumstances favors its descriptive side, because most commands
need explanatory details in order to be obeyed. The rule of law continually adapts
itself to a new historical epoch through prudence and its various applications and
incorporating various degrees of normativity by means of detail and specificity.
Interestingly, the rule of law and its bare linguistic rendition constitute the back
bone of everybody's general legal education and cultural legal background. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, its detailed statutory or case law application remains
only vaguely known and approximated by the majority of the public, and of course,
is only formally taught in law schools;28 occasionally, and surprisingly, it is mis-
understood by judges themselves.29
II. JURISTS' COMPLACENCE ABOUT LAW'S AMBIGUITY
If legal knowledge is inherently imperfect because of its highly hierarchical
structure which encourages retention of the main constitutional principles (the rule
25 UNGER, supra note 22, at 5.
26 See id. and text accompanying notes 5 to 7 supra.
27 UNGER, supra note 7, at 254.2 8 See generally, DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS (2008).
29 See e.g. Alan C. Weinstein, The Ohio Supreme Court's Perverse Stance on Development
Impact Fees and What to Do About It, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 655, 679 (2012) (describing
the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., 970 N.E.2d 916
(Ohio 2012) as " deeply distressing" : "the court failed even to acknowledge, let alone dis-
tinguish: (1) its own ruling upholding impact fees twelve years before in Homebuilders
Association of Dayton and the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, and (2) the state su-
preme court decisions that had rejected the reasoning of the Iowa and Mississippi courts
upon which the Court relied in part" Id. (internal citations omitted).
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of law translating our market-driven democracy) and approximation of the de-
scriptive applications of our rule of law, we should examine whether its linguistic
nature also plays a role in amplifying that problem.
Legal knowledge starts with the reading of the language of a legal text,
whether canonic or, more often, some cultural approximation. Referring to legal
theory and knowledge as language may be infuriating to some, but as Rousseau
diplomatically put it - "When Archimedes ran naked through the streets of Syra-
cuse to announce his findings, what he said was no less true because of the way it
was communicated."30Law is legal knowledge which translates social, economic
and political values into language which follows linguistic rules and which is fur-
ther textualized in the process of reading or actuating it. This paper postulates that
legal language, especially detailed, meticulous legal knowledge, generates an in-
herently approximate understanding.
Language shapes knowledge but because language is molded in various de-
grees by the cultural values of a society, and culture molds specialized knowledge,
American language is molded by American culture, and to the extent language
seduces us into specific patterns of thinking, American culture and its values se-
duce our thinking. 31
Our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same
questions. As long as there continues to be a verb 'to be' that looks as if it func-
tions in the same way as 'to eat' and 'to drink,' as long as we still have the adjec-
tives 'identical,' 'true', 'false, 'possible,' as long as we continue to talk of a river
of time, of an expanse of space, etc. etc., people will keep stumbling over the
same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no ex-
planation seems capable of clearing up. And what's more, this satisfies a longing
for the transcendent, because in so far as people think they can see the 'limits of
human understanding,' they believe of course that they can see beyond these.32
Of course, not all language is molded equally by cultural values, and various
cultural values mold various types of language differently. For instance, law does
not use the language of the ghetto or of some marginal subcultures. Law uses
mainstream language, and its lack of flexibility impacts legal knowledge. This lin-
guistic ossification translates into an ossification of imagination, or in law, it forces
us to stay on one informational path and to try to solve the same problems in the
manner generations before us saw and tried to solve them.
For instance, if within the last few decades, using stare decisis rather than
statutory language -42 U.S.C. 1973- has been the way to solve Section 5 Voting
Rights Act litigation, it seems reasonable to assume that this mode will be contin-
ued for a reasonable time into the future by the United States Supreme Court. This
observation further translates into compounding approximate knowledge. To fur-
ther exemplify this point, on the U.S. Department of Justice's web site, if you
search for Section 5 Voting Rights Act, your first hit is an editorializing paragraph
of the latest U.S. Supreme Court decision:
30 UNGER, supra note 7, at 192. For the original quote, see Jean Jacques Rousseau, Lettres
Ecrites de la Montagne, 3 OEUVRES COMPLETES 686 (B. Gagnebin & M. Raymond eds.,
1964).
31 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 15e (Peter Winch trans., 1980).
32 Id.
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On June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional
to use the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act to determine
whichjurisdictions are subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).33
The link to the statutory language appears further below in the page, almost
as if an afterthought.34
Linguistic ossification and ossified imagination have a potentially positive
effect; by remaining the same over a longer period of time, language could and
sometimes does foster common understanding. In law, especially, this result is
highly desirable. It can be said that the only period of societal calm that persists
for long is when interested parties and the population at large see in legal language
the same thing, or understand it as saying the same thing. Put another way, the
more flawless the communication between our social, economic and political val-
ues and their legal articulation, the easier it is to preserve social order.
However, as seen here, it is easier to maintain a flawless communication be-
tween the textual rendition of our rule of law - the Constitution -- and our social
and political commitment than between the various statutory applications of our
rule of law, and our interpretation of those legal texts. Again, that may be because
the Constitutional text is rather vague, has a religious flavor,35 and encourages a
religious type of understanding. If religious understanding requires one to go be-
yond the letter of the text, the same result surely occurs when faced with the much
more detailed statutes which abound in arid, hard to grasp, descriptive language.
It seems that no matter the degree of legal detail, nothing is obvious when it comes
to law (No vehicles in the park). Nothing seems to be comprehensively described
within statutory language, for instance. Or, as Wittgenstein noted, maybe all "as-
sertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance" 36 may
appear obvious, and easy to grasp, but somehow, the most obvious assertions "may
become the hardest of all to understand." 37
While slow to change, as Wittgenstein observed, language is nevertheless
open to interpretation. Common law language is even more so open. As Hart no-
ticed, law in the form of legal language incorporates cultural influences, whether
social observations or philosophical inquiries. To the extent that pre-existing cul-
tural interpretations mold our legal understanding, we can talk about a cultural
corrective of the multitude of possible legal readings. Think about how a statute
needs to be read together with its judicial applications, which then needs to be
divided into its binding and not-binding part (the law student's classical distinction
between holding and dicta), which in fact will be applied more or less as a matter
of faith until something happens and a contradiction between the legal language
assumed as binding and a specific situation will need to be resolved anew. That
33 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, JUSTICE.Gov,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
34 Subchapter I-A: Enforcement of Voting Rights, JUSTICE.Gov, http://wwwjus-
tice.gov/crt/about/vot/42usc/subch ia2.php#anchor 1973c (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
35 See, generally, Duncan Kennedy, American Constitutionalism as Civil Religion: Notes
of an Atheist, 19 NOVA L. REv., 909 (1995).
36 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 66 (Denis Paul & G.E.M Anscombe trans.,
G.E.M Anscombe & G.H von Wright eds., 1969).
37 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 31, at 17e.
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will involve the specific language at issue quoted and questioned and the cycle
will continue!
All these brief linguistic observations suggest that language affects our un-
derstanding and legal language affects our legal knowledge. That linguistic phe-
nomenon seems to have only one desired effect, that of preserving the approximate
nature of legal knowledge.
Concluding the findings of this first part of the paper, we saw that legal phi-
losophers such as Hart noticed our imperfect legal knowledge. Additionally, the
structure of our legal system promotes perhaps so many legal applications of our
rule of law that it becomes impossible to know much of them other than by their
main ideas and title, much like we refer to Section 5 Voting Rights Act litigation,
but we do not really know what those cases contain.38 Continuously detailing nor-
mative texts forces the reader to use interpretive cultural tools to decipher it. This
further preserves the imperfect and approximate nature of legal knowledge. Fur-
thermore, legal language is not something which people recite aloud with their
eyes closed while holding hands, or whose words people sing and dance to, or post
on their FACEBOOK account for further social engagement, or even ponder about
their meaning. Even the most renowned jurists of the land approximate legal lan-
guage from its very inception and then its application is further inexactly publi-
cized.
III. RANDOM EXAMPLES ABOUT LAW'S AMBIGUITY FOR JURISTS AND
CITIZENRY
As explained above, our rule of law, legal theory, favors normative rules. Its
practical application to particular circumstances favors its positivist or descriptive
side. If the rule of law and its bare linguistic rendition constitute the back bone of
everybody's general legal education and cultural legal background, at the opposite
spectrum, its detailed statutory or case law application remains only vaguely
known and approximated by the majority of the public. Furthermore, it is only
taught formally in law schools.39
38 § 1973: Denial or abridgement of right to vote on account of race or color through voting
qualifications or prerequisites; establishment of violation
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f) (2) [42 USCS §
1973b(f) (2)], as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it
is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or polit-
ical subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. 1973.
39 See generally, KENNEDY, supra note 28.
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From a textual perspective, the United States Constitution represents the em-
bodiment of our rule of law. It gives legal meaning to our geo-political commit-
ment to a democratic market economy. The Federal Constitution has been further
amended in order to give legal meaning to new social and economic circum-
stances. For instance, the Fifteenth Amendment became part of the Federal Con-
stitution in 1870 in order to render illegal the exercise of property rights over hu-
man beings and avoid further social disruption. The history of the latter half of the
1 9 th century was briefly summarized and legally translated into two constitutional
amendments, including the Fifteenth Amendment, whose two paragraphs read as
follows:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
This Constitutional language is confined within the dual political commit-
ment to a market democracy, by describing the democratic need to vote. While
still abstract and impersonal, the language of this amendment also uses some spe-
cific descriptors such as "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude," in an attempt to make it both inclusive and contemporarily relevant within
the perimeters of the liberal political theory of that time. Reality proved that
"[d]espite the clear wording of the Fifteenth Amendment,"40it remained easily
avoided in practice, as African Americans remained effectively disenfranchised.
Both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to do anything in a game of
"After you, my dear Alphonse," which seemed "amusing to everybody, except the
Negro."" It took a century to attempt to apply it to the practice of everyday life of
the former Confederacy, through statutory provisions and the subsequent cases in-
terpreting them.
This highly structured legal system has a somehow equally well structured
cognitive counterpart. Americans are reasonably well aware of the Federal Con-
stitution, its Bill of Rights, and some of the subsequent Amendments. This could
be the result of the fact that our entire culture is suffused with our Constitutional
principles, with the embodiment of our rule of law. Also, it could be caused by the
fact that the Constitutional text is brief and vague, almost religious,42 which makes
it easy to grasp and comprehend. Whether because of its simplicity or its short
length, when one retains the gist of an article, the gist often coincides with the
entire text. Indeed, as many observed already, legal knowledge is most inexact
when it comes to detailed statutes.43 However, no one has been able to generalize
from there and summarize that legal confusion becomes the product of detailed
textualization. The more detailed and arid the text of the law, the more sense it
makes to incorporate pre-existent cultural knowledge in the process of reading it,
if only to make it more useful, that is, to have a scope that seems useful in more
4 0 CHARLES L. ZELDEN, THE SUPREMvE COURT AND ELECTIONS: INTO THE POLITICAL THICKET
11(2010).
41 RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE Two RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
ENFRANCHISEMENT 142 (2004).
42 See Kennedy, supra note 35.
43 See HART, supra note 9.
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than one minor instance. Even more likely is that one will avoid the official text
altogether and read some apocryphal, inexact, but more clear and comprehensible
textual version, which is also more easily accessible technologically. Think only
about the ease of access by performing a Google search for "section 5 voting
rights" whose first hit is a governmental web site belonging to the Department of
Justice, which starts by editing the statutory language and then by offering a sec-
tion called "voting news." "
What constitutes a clear apocryphal version varies. For instance, in the 1 9 th
century, cultural manifestations of constitutional amendments included newspaper
editorials, comments, and articles, as well as speeches and letters by political ce-
lebrities of the day. There is no evidence that The New York Times reproduced and
published the text of the Fifteenth Amendment until every citizen could recite it.
But there is proof that The Times published many reactions to this legal text. On
April 11, 1870, for instance, it published an emotional, poetic, metaphor-laden let-
ter Frederick Douglas wrote earlier on April 5, which had the advantage of sum-
marizing the gist of the Amendment upon which Americans and, for the first time,
African-Americans could and should vote:
The revolution wrought in our condition by the Fifteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States, is almost startling, even to me. I view it with some-
thing like amazement. It is truly vast and wonderful, and when we think through
what labors, tears, treasures and precious blood it has come, we may well con-
template it with solemn joy. Henceforth, we live in a new world, breath a new
atmosphere, have a new earth beneath and a new sky above us. Our new condition
brings with it that which should make us thoughtful as well as joyful. It sweeps
the future of our ancient shortcomings, and flings us as a race upon our own re-
sponsibility. Equal before the Lord, equal in the ballot-box and in the jury-box,
the glory or shame of our future condition is to lie upon ourselveS4 5.
Interestingly, despite its clear meaning,4 6 there is a huge gap between the text
of the Fifteenth Amendmentand its application in the former Confederate states.
The difference of interpretation could be seen as the result of the divergent cultural
values between the North and the South as well as between the white and black
communities of the former Confederate states. The cultural convergence element,
briefly explained earlier, requires a long period of time in which cultural values
are able to become common and voluntarily absorbed, promoted and thus obeyed.
As shown here, it took a century to start the cultural dialogue of their moral im-
portance and incorporate them into a detailed legal text."
Within the structure of our legal system, the gap between the wording of the
Fifteenth Amendment and its application was solved in the same textual manner
as the earlier Constitutional gap between the ideas of a market democracy and of
human beings as the object of property: through more legal text. Suffice it to men-
tion that before the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, judges readily applied
44 Voting, JUSTICE.Gov, www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/ (result obtained Apr. 12, 2014).
45 Frederick Douglas, Frederick Douglass on the Fifteenth Amendment, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
11, 1870 at 1.
46 ZELDEN, supra note 40.
47 Id. at 11-35.
48 See now 42 U.S.C. 1973 (originally Pub. L. 89-110, title I, § 2, Aug. 6, 1965).
492
The Many Texts of the Law
the positive law known as the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850,49 which stip-
ulated federal involvement in slave-catching in Northern states, while expressing
moral qualms about the evil nature of slavery.50 One infamous instance is Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,5 1 where Justice Story held that the federal Fugitive Slave Act pre-
cluded a Pennsylvania state law that prohibited blacks from being taken out of
Pennsylvania into slavery, and overturned the conviction of Edward Prigg - a slave
catcher who kidnapped the black woman Margaret Morgan to bring her back into
slavery - as a result. Even more dramatically, the Supreme Court reached its deci-
sion in Dredd Scott v. Sandford,52 by holding that slaves were not citizens within
the meaning of the Constitution and therefore were not entitled to the rights that
belong to citizens, 53 to only reverse itself years later, in the Slaughter-House
Cases,5 4 on the same constitutional grounds - fortunately much changed since
1842.
In 1965, following the principles of our rule of law and in the wake of the
deadly events at the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama, the federal Con-
gress finally passed specific legislation which applied both legal theory and pru-
dence to rectify the wrongs created by our American slavery past.55 With that spe-
cific act of legislation, the datable act of 1965, Congress hoped that there would
be no further dilemmas in understanding and applying the right to vote laws. If the
Fifteenth Amendment gave voice to democratic political principles, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 applied those principles. The language of the Act incorporated
the political wisdom of the day, political reasoning or prudence,56 and applied it to
the reality of the American South.57 Each subsequent amendment and case law
interpretation meant a new application of those hard-won moral and democratic
principles to a particular historical moment, which created their own approximate
and imperfect cognitive dissonance between the text of the law and its actuation.
The Voting Rights Act 1965 specifically and permanently outlawed:
election procedures denying or abridging the "right of any citizen of the U.S. to
vote on account of race or color;"
4 Act of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (providing for removal of alleged slaves
"upon proof to the satisfaction of such [federal] judge or [state] magistrates"); Act of Sep-
tember 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (expanding federal involvement in capture of fugitive
slaves, including providing for appointment of special federal commissioners to hear fugi-
tive rendition proceedings and issue certificates of removal; also establishing penalties for
interfering with capture of runaways).
50 For an in-depth discussion about the morality of upholding the Fugitive Slave Act, see,
e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) and Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the
Slave-Catchers (Book Review), TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437.
51 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
52 Dred Scotty. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
53 J. Randy Sawyer, The Last Line of Defense: A Comparative Analysis of United States
Supreme Court and New Jersey Supreme CourtApproaches to Racial Bias in the Imposition
of the Death Penalty, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 663, 721 (1997).
54 83 U.S. 36, 73, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872).
5 For more details, see generally, ZELDEN, supra note 40.
56 See supra notes 32 et seq. and accompanying text.
5 ZELDEN, supra note 40, at 36, 50.
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literacy and moral requirements and other such test or device that denied or
abridged voting rights of racial minorities.
In addition, the Act contained some temporary provisions which needed pe-
riodical Congressional intervention in the form of extensions. Among them, Sec-
tion 5 requires "preclearance of all changes in voting laws or procedures in certain
states and political subdivisions." 5 Since then, Section 5 has been renewed four
times, most recently in 2006. Its latest renewal, like the preceding one, is supposed
to last 25 years and, like its preceding extension, is already heavily litigated, as
well as, apparently, manipulated, 59 and caricatured. 60
Though exceedingly detailed, Section 5 remains a harbinger of ambiguity as
it continues its course through the judiciary system. Some of its preceding exten-
sions, for example, caused the United States Supreme Court Justices to "make up"
statutory language under the guise of interpreting and "applying" the statute. 6 1
Some may argue that it sounds worse than it is. 62 Moreover, just last year, for in-
stance, the Department of Justice invoked Section 5 to stop Republican- backed
voter-identification laws in Texas and South Carolina from going into effect. But
was it the spirit or the letter of the law DOJ invoked? Does it make any difference
if the DOJ invoked the gist of the law? If we look at the issues raised in Shelby
County v. Holder,63 during oral argument 64 one is at a loss to answer these ques-
tions. Furthermore, while this case was pending, most of us followed its course
through blogs or even comedians' monologues 65 or online news outlets. 66 All these
outlets, official or not, are easily accessible through the Internet, but only the apoc-
ryphal ones are easy to understand perhaps because the language they use is more
culturally relevant to the reader than the arid canonic text of the law.
The litigation raised by the application of Section 5 of the 1965 Act demon-
strates that legal approximation persists irrespective of the level of detail of the
legal text. Through the decades following its passage, the language of the Voting
Rights Act has been approximated and guessed, and misquoted by all courts in-
cluding the Supreme Court of the land,67 which indicates that our understanding
or the Act is imperfect, and neither lay subjects nor legal professionals can agree
58 Daniel McCool, Meaningful Votes, in THE MOST FUNDAMIENTAL RIGHT: CONTRASTING
PERSPECTIVES ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 3-35 (Daniel McCool ed., 5th ed. 2012).
51 Steven Yaccino & Lizette Alvarez, New G.O.P. Bid to Limit Voting in Swing States, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2014.
60 Marquel, New G.O.P. Bid to Limit Voting Swing States. Black Districts to Vote at Local
Zoos, THEPOTHOLEVIEW.COM, Mar. 29, 2014.
61 See discussion below.
62 Id.
63 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _ (2013)
64Available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/12-96.pdf.
65 Bill Maher, Maybe The Voting Rights Act Is Not Helping Minorities, available
athttp://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2013/03/02/bill maher maybe the vot-
ingrights act is not helpingminorities.html.
66 Paul M. Barett, The Unintended Consequences of the Voting Rights Act,
BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-
04/unintended-consequences-of-the-voting-rights-act.
67 See discussion below.
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on anything other than a limited temporary meaning.
The following are but two examples representing Voting Rights Act cases
which reached the United States Supreme Court: Beer v. United States,68 and Reno
v. Bossier Parish School Board.6 9 In Beer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that ap-
plying Section 5, the DOJ had to determine within the preclearance context
whether the proposed change would have a discriminatory effect on the minority
voting rights effect defined as "retrogression." 0
By prohibiting the enforcement of a voting-procedure change until it has been
demonstrated to the United States Department of Justice or to a three-judge fed-
eral court that the change does not have a discriminatory effect, Congress desired
to prevent States from "undo(ing) or defeat(ing) the rights recently won" by Ne-
groes. H.R.Rep.No.91-397, p. 8, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1970, p. 3284.
Section 5 was intended "to insure that (the gains thus far achieved in minority
political participation) shall not be destroyed through new (discriminatory) pro-
cedures and techniques." S.Rep.No.94-295, p. 19, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1975, p. 785.
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1975, Congress
explicitly stated that "the standard (under s 5) can only be fully satisfied by de-
termining on the basis of the facts found by the Attorney General (or the District
Court) to be true whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the polit-
ical process and to elect their choices to office is Augmented, diminished, or not
affected by the change affecting voting...." H.R.Rep.No.94-196, p. 60 [...] In
other words the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure
changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise (em-
phasis added).71
As shown above, "retrogression" is a conclusion the Justices used to define
anundesired effect under Section 5. Retrogression was meant to describe the effect
prohibited by Section 5, which were changes that place minority voters in a worse
position than under the status quo ante.72
But using that term the Court did not rely on the statutory language. By using
a term that was not part of the statutory language, the Court indicated that their
legal understanding, their legal knowledge was imperfect. As Justice Thurgood
Marshall noted in his dissent,73 the term "retrogression" came from a passage in
an extraneous document, a House Report, that the Court identified in its opinion.
Legislative history, of course, is not an integral part of a statute.
In justifying its convoluted construction of § 5, however, the Court never deals
with the fact that, by its plain language, § 5 does no more than adopt, or arguably
68 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
69 Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
70 Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
71 Id. at 140-41.
72 Peyton McCrary, The Constitutional Foundations of the "Preclearance" Process: How
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Was Enforced, 1965-2005 in McCool ed., supra note
58,at 44-45.
73 Beer, 425 U.S. at 146.
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expand,FN5 the constitutional standard. Since it has never been held, or even sug-
gested, that the constitutional standard requires an inquiry into whether a redis-
tricting plan is "ameliorative" or "retrogressive," A fortiori there is no basis for
so reading § 5. While the Court attempts to provide a basis by relying on the
asserted purpose of § 5 to preserve present Negro voting strength ... it is wholly
unsuccessful. What superficial credibility the argument musters is achieved by
ignoring not only the statutory language, but also at least three other purposes
behind § 5.74
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,15 rather than rectifying the earlier ap-
proximate legal meaning, incorporated it. Rather than focus on the statutory lan-
guage of Section 5, its canonic language, the Court again ignored it. This seems a
clear indication that legal knowledge cannot emanate solely from the official text
of the law, and fictional tools, such as "stare decisis" are best suited to ensure its
normative function of promoting the rule of law. Justice Scalia, who wrote the
majority opinion in Bossier and who, ironically, is probably the Court's most com-
mitted opponent of the relevance of statutory history,7 incorporated the previous
Court construct of "retrogression" in Bossier's statutory application of Section 5,
and further diluted the statutory knowledge by expanding this term of art to define
the statutory "purpose" as well as its "effect."
These examples demonstrate that statutes, which are detailed applications of
our rule of law, embodied by our Constitution, cannot and do not generate exact
legal knowledge. To the contrary, their descriptive, arid content encourages ap-
proximate knowledge which needs to be supplemented with other sources in addi-
tion to the statutory language itself. This reality reminds one of Hart's observations
that legal differences are inherent and jurists use specific tools to ensure legal co-
herence viewed as necessary for law's normativity." Stare decisis works as a cor-
rective tool.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo quoting William Galbraith Miller's The Data of
Jurisprudence9 described the importance of stare decisis more than a century ago,
in this way:
If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same
decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on oppo-
site principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a
defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To
decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my
breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights. 0
Cardozo's Sisyphus-type of hunt for consistency in the face of approximate
legal knowledge and ambiguity is perhaps best matched by that of Justice Antonin
74 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 149-50 (1976).
75Reno v. BossierParish Sch. Bd, 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
76 More on Scalia's inconsistent statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Ser-
vices, N.A 131 S.C.t 716, 731 et seq. (2011) (Scalia's dissent); also, Mark Tushnet, Theory
and Practice in Statutory Interpretation, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1185 (2011).
7 Bossier, 528 U.S. at 341.
78 See HART, supra note 9.
7 9 WILLIAM GALBRAITH MILLER, THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE (1903).
s
0 BENJAMINN. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921).
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Scalia, whose attempts to ensure consistency are remarkable:
[O]ne of the most substantial... competing values [in adjudication], which often
contradicts the search for perfection, is the appearance of equal treatment. As a
motivating force of the human spirit, that value cannot be overestimated."
More philosophically than factually possible, Justice Scalia professes to use
statutory language to a fault.82 In practice, though, he uses whatever tools fit the
decision he has in mind - in our Voting Rights Act example, Scalia used legislative
history ignoring the statutory language.83
Others are more honest and realize that professing one thing and doing an-
other does not change reality. For instance, scholars have noted the unreliable char-
acter of stare decisis since 1930, when Jerome Frank published his findings that a
court could decide one way or the opposite and make its reasoning appear equally
flawless." The Critical Legal Studies movement founded itself upon a similar
point.
If legal knowledge is inherently imperfect because of its highly hierarchical
structure which encourages retention of the main constitutional principles (the rule
of law translating our market-driven democracy) and approximation of the de-
scriptive applications of our rule of law, we also saw that its linguistic nature also
plays a role in this legal ambiguity. To continue our investigation then the next
step should be an introspective analysis of our legal education.
IV HAVE HEAVILY EDITED CASEBOOKS INTRODUCED THE TASTE FOR
THE APOCRYPHAL AND PARTIAL
American law schools are renowned for their Socratic method which makes
students learn as they espouse their ignorance. The birth of this method dates back
to 1870, the year when Christopher Columbus Langdell became Harvard's Dane
Professor:
The day came for its first trial. The class gathered in the old amphitheater of Dane
Hall - the one lecture room of the School - and opened their strange new pam-
phlets, reports bereft of their only useful part, the head-notes! The lecturer opened
his.
"Mr Fox, will you state the facts in the case of Payne v. Cave?"
Mr. Fox did his best with the facts of the case.
81 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV., 1175, 1178
(1989).
82 Antonin Scalia, Common-law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Court in Interpreting the Constitutions and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 31 (1997).
83 William D. Popkin, An Internal Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpre-
tation, 76 MINN. L. REV., 1133, 1143 (1992).84 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 72 (1930).
85 See, e.g.,UNGER, supra note 22; Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A
Critical Look at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. REV. 233, 279 (1985); Dana Neacsu, CLS Stands
for Critical Legal Studies, IfAnyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 415 (2000).
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"Mr. Rawle, will you give the plaintiff's argument?"
Mr Rawle gave what he could of the plaintiff's argument.
"Mr. Adams, do you agree with that?"
And the case-system of teaching law had begun....86
From the perspective of this article, what is remarkable about Langdell's
method, as then Harvard President Eliot remarked, was his reliance on the authen-
tic version of the law (an accurate version of a decision). Professor Langdell taught
law by asking his students to go to the original sources. And indeed, Payne v. Cave,
the case that started the Harvard educational revolution was reproduced in the case
book in its entirety." Langdell did not ask his students to approximate the law or
recite definitions and rules: "When and by what statute were lands made alienable
in England after the conquest?" 8 nor "What is the difference between an action of
trespass and an action of trespass upon the case?"89 Langdell believed and taught
his students that learning law was possible by reading and analyzing the original
sources 90 which were both available - printed in the case book, and available to a
limited extent in the library - and understandable, thus permitting the deconstruc-
tion of the text and its reconstruction through analysis.
Langdell's original Socratic method relied on case-books as an anthology, a
collection of cases presented in their entirety to the student to read and analyze.
Langdell thought using primary sources, the law itself in its original authoritative
form, would teach students "what the law is." 91 By analogy to chemistry, Harvard
University President Eliot explained Langdell' s methodology:
[Langdell] told me that the way to study [law] was to go to the original sources. I
knew it was true, for I had been brought up in the science of chemistry myself;
and one of the first rules of a conscientious student of science is never to take a
fact or a principle out of second hand treatises, but to go to the original [source].92
Interestingly enough, for the last century, the case law method has departed
from its original meaning, as envisaged by what purports to be the Langdell
method: asking the students to read and analyze cases, "the orginal source" of law.
Now, casebooks are such a collection of heavily edited and shortened versions of
86 2 CHARLES WARREN HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND EARLY LEGAL
CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 372 (1908).
87 Payne v. Cave, 3 T.R. 148, 3 Burr. 1921 (1789).
8 WARREN, supra note 86, at 373.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 361.
91 Interestingly, however, Langdell did not claim that his casebook was to facilitate case
learning in the Socratic model. In his first casebook, available in the Harvard Law Library,
he says simply that he was making the casebook available because there were not enough
copies of the cases in the library collection.
92 Id. at 361.
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cases9 that their purpose cannot be Langdell's-- teaching students "to never take
a fact or a principle out of second hand treatises, but to go to the original [document
for] that fact or principle."94 Under the guise of adherence to Langdell's principle
that law is science, casebooks are currently serving the students a goulash of def-
initions and rules, and contextual information, in other words secondary sources.
Ironically, this is what Langdell wanted to end, because something like this pot-
pourri method is what law students were taught in the pre-Langdell years.
Today, such shorthand study of the law mirrors, perhaps unintentionally, a
technological culture, which panders to the limited attention span inculcated and
fostered by the advent of MTV, videogames and social media interactions. Could
it be possible that this legal ersatz chips away at our professional reverence for the
original source of the law, and as professionals we are getting ready to treat a
WIKIPEDIA version of the law in the same manner that Langdell's conscientious
law student read the original text -albeit reproduced in a case book under the su-
pervision of a law student - the research assistant - and of his law professor?
V How THE DISTRIBUTION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND OUR USE OF
TECHNOLOGY ENCOURAGE RELIANCE ON APOCRYPHAL TEXTS
Perhaps the way professionals are taught encourages a shift of their reliance.
Perhaps technology has a role in that too, and it causes both professionals and lay
citizens to confuse or ignore differences between the original and the apocryphal
version of the law.
In this section we will focus on one factor that we believe continues to make
legal knowledge ambiguous for the lay person: the distribution of legal infor-
mation and how we interact with it and perform legal research in a way that further
contributes to the dilution of legal knowledge. Technology intermediates any tex-
tual reading, and this paper argues, favors a legal reading of the more widely ac-
cessible though not necessarily official texts.
Our society is governed by the "rule of law" which engenders a specific type
of legal system with specific legal rules which enjoy a well-established set of char-
acteristics. As Roberto M. Unger explained, to become binding and enforceable
rules, the laws of any liberal state, need to be "general, uniform, public, and capa-
ble of coercive enforcement."95 But what does it mean to be public today in our
culture suffused by legal vernacular? Do we need to access the canonic, official,
legal texts? Is it sufficient to read a WIKIPEDIA summary? If commercial entities
can publish official versions of governmental law, can a WIKIPEDIA summary re-
place them all? Furthermore, as this paper suggests, if our legal knowledge is by
its nature approximate, what is the value of the canonic text? It seems that we
93 E. Allan Farnsworth, Casebooks and Scholarship: Confessions of an American Opinion
Clipper, 42 Sw. L.J. 903, 909 (1988) (collections of cases easy to digest by students); Mat-
thew Bodie, The Future of the Casebook: An Argument for an Open-Source Approach, 57
J. LEGAL EDUC. 10, 14 (2007) (casebooks collages of cases); Anne M. Corbin & Steven B.
Dow, Breaking the Cycle: Scientific Discourse in Legal Education, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH
& ENvTL. L. 191 (2007) (casebooks collections of heavily edited and sunumarized cases;
empirical data about the percentage of dicta casebooks reproduce).
94 2 CHARLES WARREN HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND EARLY LEGAL
CONDITIONS IN AMERICA. 361 (1908).
9 UNGER, supra note 7, at 73.
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ignore it either because it is dense or because to apply it both jurists and lay people
need to understand it and their understanding relies on cultural manifestations of
the rule of law.
Our "rule of law" requires its legal norms to be public, as Unger makes clear.
This mandate was established by the Articles of Confederation. Article I, §5, cl. 3
of the U.S. Constitution requires the same: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same..." Article IV, § 1 also adds
that all legal norms be published and authenticated:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect thereof.96
However, publicity has a historical reality and it may mean different things
depending on the technology available at a specific point in time. For instance,
since 1813, the government became responsible for distributing legal information
to specific institutions, libraries. The Resolution for the Printing and Distribution
of an Additional Number of the Journals of Congress, and of the Documents Pub-
lished Under Their Order,9 7 was subsequently amended and it became the Act
Providing for Keeping and Distributing All Public Documents.9 8 A year later the
Government Printing Office was created, charged with "packing, distributing, col-
lecting, arranging, classifying, and preserving such documents." 99
Until very recently, technology reduced this conversation to print. The
GPO's publications were: one collection of print statutes, the Statutes at Large and
their codified version, the United States Code, one set of cases from the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Reports, ominously abbreviated U.S., and
the rules issued by federal agencies, again in two formats, sequentially -the Fed-
eral Register - and topically - the Code of Federal Regulations. With few excep-
tions, such as New York's statutory compilations privately published by Thom-
son/West and Elsevier/Lexis, state governments were responsible for making sure
that, as Kafka suggested, and Bentham demanded, law remains accessible at all
times to everyone. 100
Where the government does not print the information there is no official legal
text for the specific set of legal norms. New York, for instance, has no official
statutory compilations, as all statutory print publications belong to the duopoly -
West and Lexis. Professionally, one may argue, there is a preference for the West
product, as the national guide to uniform legal citations, The Bluebook, positions
the West publication, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated
ahead of the Lexis/Nexis product, New York Consolidated Law Service.101 The
96 U.S. CONST.. art. IV, §1 (emphasis added).
9 J. Res. 1, 13th Cong., 3 Stat. 140 (1813).
98 Ch. 22, § 1, 11 Stat. 379, 379 (1859).
9 Id.
100 For more on the history of accessing legislation, see, e.g., Shannon E. Martin & Gerry
Lanosga, The Historical and Legal Underpinnings of Access to Public Documents, 102
LAWLIBR. J., 613 (2010).
101 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 255 (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
500
The Many Texts of the Law
Bluebook itself, however, specifically says "Cite to one of the following sources,
if therein." 102However, as a practical matter, English reads from top to bottom,
and McKinney's position as first listed further encourages its use by those follow-
ing The Bluebook. In other words, while there is no official source,103 the preferred
sources are the financially highly prohibitive sources published by West and Lexis,
making legal information the fiefdom of a legal duopoly.104
The advent of digitization did cause some extravagant results in the distribu-
tion of legal information. Within certain limits which have suddenly become both
more obvious and insurmountable, the federal government has improved its digital
presence and made legal research possible for free using the official digital repos-
itories of statutes and administrative law.105 At the federal level, the search engine
of the official web site, FDSys 106 continues to amass more and more statutory and
administrative information, but its access remains cumbersome. Moreover, when
it comes to case law, in addition to the overwhelming process of locating cases,
updating their status is a money proposition dictated by the older behemoths
Westlaw and Lexis, and their younger contender, the seemingly more affordable
Bloomberg which charges a fraction of the price of the others.107 At the state level,
the legal research problems are so intractable that despite the fact that we could
talk about New York officially published statutes for the first time, - ny.gov - open
legislation- the questions of currency and authentication,0 8 for instance, remain
unanswered, unknown, and unknowable.
Thus, while digitization made the government's work of publishing its laws
much less difficult, the government -federal and state- chose to outsource this fun-
damental job of providing the official text of its laws, by contracting with com-
mercial entities or making it easier for corporations to cannibalize its responsibil-
ities - see the New York situation - and generate, collect, store, and retrieve the
official version of our legal information, such as statutes and cases and then make
legal knowledge a matter of who has enough money to pay for it. Perhaps the most
outrageous legal dissemination is related to federal case law, which has hitherto
102 Id. at 215.
103 KENDALL SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER'S GUIDE AND REFERENCE MANUAL
651 (2012).
104 See generally, David Hall, Google, Westlaw, LexisNexis and Open Access: How the
Demand for Free Legal Research Will Change the Legal Profession, 26 SYRACUSE SCI &
TECH L. REP., 53 (2012).
105 LEGAL RESEARCH WIKI, http://legalresearch.wikischolars.columbia.edu/ (last visited
Aug. 5, 2014).
106 FDSYs, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/(last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
107 There are less costly alternatives of these databases, some offered by each state Bar
Association to their members. FastCase is such an alternative. CaseText.com is the new kid
on the block still working to create a free-of-charge case law database with a crowd sourcing
citatory.
10 For more information on authentication, see, e.g., http://conmunity.aallnet.org/digi-
talaccesstolegalinformationconmittee/stateonlinelegalinformation
http://govinfo.sla.org/2011/07/28/authentication-digital-law-report-from-aall/
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2010/rpt/2010-R-0511.htm http://blog.law.cor-
nell.edu/voxpop/tag/authentication-of-electronic-legal-information/(last visited Aug. 5,
2014).
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been the unchallenged print fiefdom of West. The 2002 E-Government Act 09 en-
couraged federal courts to post their decisions on-line, but this is not necessarily
going to facilitate legal research; legal research is not something tantamount to
finding one's name in the phone book: you do not tend to locate it by the court and
parties' names.
First, PACER, the federal courts' system for electronic access to records, has
recently celebrated a quarter century.110 That milestone happened to coincide with
the troubled launch of the Healthcare.gov website. In sharp contrast, the venerable
Public Access to Court Electronic Records is a government site that with the ca-
veat presented below, has been remarkably stable and successful.
PACER does contain hundreds of millions of digitized court documents,
dockets, memos, opinions, etc., but it is cumbersome and crotchety to use, often
cryptic in its naming and coding, and archaic in its document handling, so it is
more an access-teaser than an access point to information. Part of PACER's prob-
lem is that it is actually 214 separate systems. Every appellate, district and bank-
ruptcy court maintains its own site, each requiring a separate search. The site's
partial solution to this dispersion is the Case Locator, an index for searching case
information across the PACER system. But the Case Locator is updated only once
daily, collects only subsets of data from court sites, and has limited functionality.
What PACER needs is a whole new interface-one that provides universal search,
more robust search tools, more informative search results, and better ways to man-
age documents and downloads.
It turns out that such an interface already exists. It comes from PacerPro, a
service started by Gavin McGrane, a San Francisco lawyer who became frustrated
with PACER's shortcomings and wanted an easier way to use it. Even better, Pac-
erPro is now free. It launched in November 2012 as a subscription service at $25
a month. But in January it eliminated the subscription fee. "We decided to allow
people to get a chance to know us and see how good the product is," McGrane said
ominously, implying a future plan to revert to a pay-to-play service.'
Second, the text of the United States laws has become a profitable commod-
ity. To the extent that corporations own the monopoly over information and the
copyright over the pagination of that infornation,1 12 they "dictate the movement
09iPub.L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
110 Robert Ambrogi, Service Offers a Better Way to Search Federal Court Records Than
PACER, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2014, 2:30 AM)
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/service offers a better way to search fed-
eral court records thanpacer/?utm source=maestro&utm medium email&utm cam-
paign tech monthly.
"I Id.
112 It is not absolutely clear yet that mere pagination is any different than the alphabetization
found uncopyrightable in Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991), which thus limits West's 1986 triumph over Mead Data Central, Lexis's parent
company, in the Eighth Circuit, which held that West had a copyright interest in the pagi-
nated arrangement of the cases in its National Reporter System (West Publ'g Co. v. Mead
Data Cent. Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1241) (8th Cir. 1986)). For more, see, e.g., Olufunmilayo
B. Arewa, Open Access inA Closed Universe: Lexis, Westlaw, Law Schools, and the Legal
Information Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 797, 839 (2006). William R. Mills, The
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and use of that information, which is very profitable."113
The few free sources of legal information are trying to reproduce the official
information, for example Cornell's LIIn while others editorialize that infor-
mation, (see WIKIPEDIA), and even others create guides about how to navigate the
free sources of legal information and to lean to what extent you can rely on
them.15 WIKIPEDIA summaries are by far the best known and the most influential
in production of legal knowledge. They come at the top of any list generated by a
Google search. Furthermore, the language the WIKIPEDIA editors use is devoid of
legalese and other trade-imposed jargon, endearing it to readers as user-friendly.
While professionals may be skeptical of calling this true legal knowledge, it is
only from the point of the Hartian that only what judges see must be termed legal.
From the point of what is "public," it is clear that WIKIPEDIA probably wins that
contest hands-down.
If the majority of the public relies on WIKIPEDIA summaries, then what can
be said about the legal knowledge of legal professionals? Their research patterns
simulate the lay person's search patterns because Google searches and WIKIPEDIA
summaries are ingrained in our searches - to the extent we use the Internet, of
course.116 Additionally, all legal research, if topical, starts with a commentary or
analysis which is labeled as "secondary sources." Yale's Morris Cohen said it
many times: "Secondary sources are usually more straightforward and try to ex-
plain the law."" Their language is the one that students of the law will remember
when they read a statute or case. Of course, the student and jurist will ultimately
cite to the official text of the law, but its use is determined by that apocryphal
version of the law, whether it comes from WIKIPEDIA or a professional journal,
and if you take Hart seriously, the penumbra, which far outnumbers the core of
any statute, will be dominated by WIKIPEDIA or similar publications of the future.
Reaching the end of this paper, it seems ominously possible that we could
live in a WIKIPEDIA world and few would know the difference. Were it not for the
BLUEBOOK, which requires the citation to the official canonic text of the law, per-
haps we would be already there.
A century ago, this conclusion would have been only acceptable to the likes
of Walter Lippmann, a journalist who choreographed the government war propa-
ganda efforts under the Wilson administration, partly because he mistrusted the
ability of the masses to govern themselves. Lippmanm believed ordinary citizens
did not have the ability to gather the knowledge required by what he considered
Decline and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm: Trustworthiness of Case Reports in the Digi-
talAge, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 917, 926 (2009).
113 Gary Wolf, Who Owns the Law?, WIRED,
http://www.wired.conwired/archive/2.05/the.lawpr.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
114 Legal Information Institute, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.comell.edu/ (last
visitedAug. 5, 2014).
115 LEGAL RESEARCH WIK, http://legalresearch.wikischolars.columbia.edu/ (last visited
Aug. 5, 2014).
116 See generally, Dana Neacsu, The Internet: Academic Foe or Friend- Google and Fed-
erated Searches May Point the Way Forward for Branding Law Libraries, AALL
SPECTRUM, 25-26 (2013).117 MORRIS L. COHEN & KENT C. OLSON, LEGAL RESEARCH IN A NUTSHELL 32 (2010).
503
3 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2014)
our utopian democratic principles. 11 Lippmann's position was that governing was
the job of the educated elites and, if his background were to be an indication of
what he understood to be elites, then these were limited to Harvard graduates. In
his view, the educated elites would also editorialize the news and other pieces of
knowledge and coat it with a lot of cultural gossip disseminated for mass con-
sumption through mass media. But judging by what we have discussed here, it
seems that at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, our legal elites are, in addi-
tion to our U.S. Supreme Court Justices, the WIKIPEDIA editors as well as the
Google engineers who write the Google algorithms promoting the WIKIPEDIA en-
tries at the top of any Google search we perform.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper addressed the law's textual identity which seems to dictate legal
knowledge: its depth and comprehensiveness. Furthermore, the distribution of le-
gal information and our legal research habits, tend to have users invoke the specific
and tangible statutes or cases, such as the Voting Rights Act 1965, or the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, in their official canonic
version, but use their interactions with other versions of the law, commercial or
not, summarizing in various cultural forms the official record. The more compli-
cated question now becomes whether anything should be done about our canonic
official legal texts, or whether we should allow the fiction regarding their cognitive
legal role to continue.
Most of the time law is conceived abstractly -- in its esoteric form -- as a
norm designed to dictate our behavior. However, when we talk about legal norms
we invoke their grounds and sources. At that moment law becomes more than an
abstract concept. At that moment we can visualize it as something technologically
accessible. Its location depends on the reader's interaction with the legal technol-
ogy. Jurists tend to invoke an official legal repository, such as the United States
Code, and will cite the exact location of a statute, in its official, canonic version,
such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). We summon the powers associated with the of-
ficial text of the law but, this essay contends, due to the nature of legal knowledge,
including its language, and the distribution of legal information, which influence
the way we access or research law, we use some apocryphal and widely available
but not necessarily reliable version of the law- including its WIKIPEDIA summary.
This is not a new problem, internationally, or in the United States. One of the
goals of the French Revolution was to destroy the system whereby judges ruled as
tyrants, applying an unknowable law in an unknowable way. The immediate result
was the famous French Code Civil, which reduced dozens of treatises into a simple
volume in which all of the law could be found, at least according to the intents of
its authors. Around the same time Jeremy Bentham insisted that law, to be truly
law, had to be knowable to the extent that it should be posted, and concise enough
to be so posted, at the entrance to every train station. Big business for abstract-
writers, we suppose. And, at around the same time, New York's Justice Field sug-
gested and led a nationwide campaign to simplify the common law into a code
118 See generally, WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922); WALTER LIPPMANNTHE
PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925).
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along the French model, so to achieve Bentham's goal of codifying the entire Com-
mon Law. 119
We are clearly farther from the goal than ever. And it seems the goal is re-
ceding at record pace. What does it mean for the meaning of law?
" LORD HALSBURY quoting Bentham in his Introduction to THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Vol.
I. p, ccviii): "To render a code of laws complete [requires] taking the body of the laws in
their entirety..." See C.K. Ogden, Introduction, xviii-xix in JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY
OF LEGISLATION (1931).
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